Civilians prefer formal programmes for the reintegration of violent extremists in Somalia

Two scientific articles published in the Journal of Peace Research and Conflict, Security and Development examine the relationship between political development at the local level and civilian support for the deradicalisation and reintegration of former al-Shabaab combatants into Somali society.

Deteriorating diplomatic relations between Ethiopia and Somalia have recently brought geopolitical developments in Somalia into the spotlight of international news.

"The conflict in Somalia is important, not only for the country’s future and regional security but also for understanding global conflict trends related to terrorism and international trade routes", explains Linnéa Gelot, Associate Professor and Lecturer in War Studies at the Swedish Defence University.

In their research, she and Prabin B. Khadka, Lecturer in Political Science at the University of Essex, examine citizens' support for reintegrating former al-Shabaab combatants into society. Through their survey study and local-level interviews, they contribute to the ongoing research debate on the significance of local community support, both for disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration programmes (known as DDR in English) and for their potential to enhance security and state-building.

Does community support play a crucial role in reintegration?

Public perceptions were studied through an experimental survey with 1,503 respondents in Mogadishu, Baidoa, and Kismayo– the three Somali cities that host the largest government-supported centres for the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of violent extremists.

The research analyses Somali civilians' perceptions of the different forms of reintegration for former combatants from the armed group al-Shabaab, which has been designated as a terrorist organisation by, among others, the United States. The results show that the majority of civilians prefer government-led and UN-supported formal reintegration models for former fighters over informal models.

"We wanted to examine local community preferences for the different reintegration models, both formal and informal. This is important because previous research has shown that disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration of former combatants are more sustainable and effective if the surrounding community supports and is involved in the process."

Most existing research focuses on demobilisation and reintegration from a participant perspective (where the participant refers to the former combatant). Only a small portion of research systematically studies the social aspects of reintegration.

"Our results show that local community support is crucial for successful social reintegration. Without local support, individuals have fewer economic opportunities and a weaker social safety net. Such factors increase the risk of re-recruitment into armed groups."

Formal and informal processes

In Somalia, there are four main forms of reintegration for former combatants:

• Reintegration centres supported by the UN and donors,
• Rehabilitation programmes for convicted terrorists in prisons,
• The government’s amnesty programme for high-risk defectors, and
• Informal channels facilitated by traditional leaders.

In Linnéa Gelot and Prabin B. Khadka’s survey study, each respondent was asked to rank combatant profiles based on the process they had undergone.

"This empirical method reveals what shapes their preferences" says Linnéa Gelot.

The DDR model has typically included several steps: first, combatants must surrender their weapons, then they are registered, and the final step is reintegration. In Somalia, this model has also been expanded to include efforts to deradicalise combatants who have been part of a violent extremist group.

An interesting question is whether local Somali communities place as much emphasis on radical ideology within al-Shabaab as the international community does. The international community highlights that civilians express the strongest support for former combatants who have been reintegrated through formal processes, particularly reintegration centres supported by the UN and other donors. However, this support cannot be explained by a belief that these programmes are the most effective in terms of deradicalisation.

"We conclude that the perceived threat level from these individuals influences the programme respondents prefer. People’s past experiences—learning that there is a legitimate reason to fear these individuals—have shaped their analysis of their protection and security needs. This, in turn, affects their perceptions of the various initiatives for reintegrating former militant Islamists."

This finding adds nuance to previous research in the field, explains Prabin B. Khadka.

"We explain the variation in community support in the context of the role that risk management has long played in communities more influenced by al-Shabaab’s governance and “protection” than by government presence."

A pragmatic view on ideology

Another conclusion is that respondents place greater importance on the role a combatant had in the militant terrorist organisation than on their ideology. Did they kill someone? Were they fighters? Or were they involved in tax collection?

"We found that respondents had lower confidence in the ability of individuals who had killed others to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into society."

"According to our analysis, civilians generally have a rather pragmatic view of ideology. They believe that the vast majority of those recruited into the group are motivated by other basic factors, such as fear, clan affiliation, and poverty. People are, of course, aware that al-Shabaab has violent extremists in leadership positions, but it is often the case that "high-risk" defectors are captured within the Somali government’s amnesty programme."

Public awareness of the programmes is high

A question that arises when reading the article and about the quantitative method is whether survey respondents fully understand what they are answering. Do they even know about the different reintegration programmes well enough to assess which of the four methods they consider best?

The researchers are planning further studies in Somalia and closely follow the Somali government’s military offensive against al-Shabaab through news reporting.

"Thanks to our established contacts, we can analyse how the government’s military offensive against al-Shabaab is being conducted and perceived from a local perspective. We can illustrate how al-Shabaab’s de facto authority and control shape local opinion and how their degree of social legitimacy (as well as the fear resulting from brutal repression) influences and complicates government initiatives to combat the group. We also aim to study the support provided by stabilisation actors to Somali security forces and how the supply of weapons to certain clan militias, intended to assist in fighting al-Shabaab, risks escalating conflicts within and between clans."

At the same time, she notes that more reflection is needed on what further steps can be taken to make Somali security forces' military successes more effective, while also increasing both government presence and credibility.